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DEALING WITH COMMUNIST PAST:




This article analyzes the significance of the activity of the Presidential Commission
for the Analysis of the Communist Dictatorship in Romania (PCACDR) and the im-
pact of its report on the basis of which the communist regime was condemned as
criminal and illegitimate. The author also situates the Romanian case within the
larger discussions on the role of overcoming a traumatic past in post-authoritarian
democracies. PCADCR rejected outright the practices of institutionalized forgetful-
ness and generated a national debate about long-denied and occulted moments of
the past. The Commission’s Final Report answered a fundamental necessity, char-
acteristic of the post-authoritarian world, that of moral clarity. It set the ground for
the revolutionizing of the normative foundations of the communal history, imposing
the necessary moral criteria of a democracy that wishes to militantly defend its val-
ues.
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acy, perpetrator, democracy
On December 16th 2006, the Romanian President condemned the communist re-
gime as “criminal and illegitimate” throughout its existence. His speech was
based upon a Final Report drafted by a Commission for the Analysis of the Com-
munist Dictatorship in Romania (PCACDR). I had the honor of chairing this com-
mission. From 2006 until present, the topic of dealing with communist past has
been at the forefront of public debate in the country. In the present article I will an-
alyze the significance of the commission’s activity and the impact of its report,
while situating it within the larger discussions on the role of overcoming a trau-
matic past in post-authoritarian democracies.
For the first time in Romania’s contemporary history, the PCADCR rejected
outright the practices of institutionalized forgetfulness and generated a national
debate about long-denied and occulted moments of the past (including instances
of collaboration, complicity, etc). The activity of the commission was “a state,
public history lesson” during which the “truth” about the communist totalitarian
experienced was “officially proclaimed and publicly exposed” (Ash, 2002), that
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is, acknowledged. It was an exercise of “sovereignty over memory” (Snyder,
2002) an attempt to set the stage for resolving what Tony Judt called the “double
crisis of memory”:
On the one hand cynicism and mistrust pervade all social, cultural
and even personal exchanges, so that the construction of civil society,
much less civil memory, is very, very difficult. On the other hand
there are multiple memories and historical myths, each of which has
learned to think of itself as legitimate simply by virtue of being pri-
vate and unofficial. Where these private or tribal versions come to-
gether, they form powerful counterhistories of a mutually antagonis-
tic and divisive nature (Judt, 2002, 173).
The post-1989 practice of state-sponsored amnesia created two main dangers:
the externalization of guilt and the ethnicization of memory. As both Dan Diner
and Gabriel Motzkin argued, the process of working through the communist past
raises a crucial problem: “How can crimes that elude the armature of an ethnic,
and thus-long term, memory be kept alive in collective remembrance?” (Diner,
2003, 86) The domination and exterminism of a communist regime generally af-
fected all strata of the population; terror and repression were engineered from
within against one’s people. Therefore, “the lack of specific connection between
Communism’s theoretical enemy and its current victims made it more difficult to
remember these victims later” (Motzkin, 2003, 202). When no Aufarbeitung took
place, the memory field was left for ‘alternative’ interpretations.
On the one hand, the evils of the communist regime were assigned to those per-
ceived as aliens: the Jews, the national minorities, or other traitors and enemies of
an organically defined nation. Such line of perverted reasoning unfolded immedi-
ately after my nomination as Chair of the PCACDR. I became the preferred target
of verbal assault, including scurrilous slanders and vicious anti-Semitic diatribes,
targeted the commission’s president (Tismaneanu, 2006, 2007). The Commission
itself was labeled as one made up of foreigners (alogeni); entire genealogies were
invented for various members of this body, all just to prove the fact that the ‘real
perpetrators’ are forcing upon the nation a falsified history of its suffering. Upon
delivering the condemnation speech, the President and some members of the
Commission were showered with threats and imprecations by the representatives
of the xenophobic and chauvinistic Romania Mare Party. Unfortunately, as an in-
dication of the deep-rooted malaise of memory in Romania, very few MPs of the
other mainstream parties publicly objected to this behavior (Nicolae Vacaroiu,
then President of the Romanian Senate, did nothing to stop this circus).
A further proof of narrow-mindedness came a few months later, when a critic
of the Final Report, found no qualms in stating that: “if it weren’t for the stupid,
but violent reactions of nationalists, extremists, etc., the Report would have
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passed almost unnoticed by the public opinion that counts, the one from which
one can expect change” (Piulea, 2007). In reality, however, such utterances are in-
dicative of a very interesting, though worrisome, post-condemnation phenome-
non: the argumentative coalition against the Final Report of a self-proclaimed
‘new left’ with the national-Stalinists (those who perpetuate the topoi of the
pre-1989 propaganda or those who are nostalgic for Ceaupescu’s “Golden Age”),
and with the fundamentalist Orthodoxists. Such alliance can be explained in two
ways: first, these are the faces of resentment, the people who were forced to con-
front their own illusions and guilt or those who stubbornly refuse to accept the de-
mise of Utopia (what in Germany fell in the category of anti-antiutopianism)
(Müller, 2000); second, these are those for whom, mostly because of ignorance,
dealing with the communist past can be resumed to mechanical instrumentaliza-
tion, for whom this redemptive act is a ‘strategic action’. The result of their mainly
journalistic flurries is one that does not surprise the sober observer: a coun-
ter-trend of malendtendu revisionism that does represent, because of its promise
of facile remembrance, a latent danger for continuation of the strategy of legal, po-
litical, and historical Aufarbeitung.
The other danger that lies in a mis-memory of communism is the development
of “two moral vocabularies, two sorts of reasoning, two different pasts”: that of
things done to ‘us’ and that of things done by ‘us’ to ‘others’. Tony Judt sees this
practice as the overall post-war European syndrome of “voluntary amnesia” (Judt,
2002, 163–6; Judt, 2005). In Romania, its most blatant manifestation was the de-
nial of the Holocaust, of the role of the Romanian state in the extermination of the
Jews.1 But another manifestation of the syndrome can also be found in relation
with the communist past. One of the master-narratives after 1989 was that, be-
cause of the Soviet imposition, the regime was not part and parcel of the national
history. It was a protracted form of foreign occupation during which the popula-
tion was victimized by foreigners and rogue, inhuman, bestial individuals. This
discourse was and is based upon the topical trinity of they & it vs. us. In later years
it went through finer qualifications: on the one hand, the “High Stalinism” period
(roughly 1947–53, with maybe the added value of 1958–62), the so-called “haunt-
ing decade”, was blamed on the “Muscovites” (mostly Pauker, Luca,
Chisinevschi) and, sometimes, but in a redemptive key on Gheorghiu Dej as well
(who also wears a historiographical cap of national awakener on the basis of his
later years in power). On the other hand, the Ceaupescu period is seen as one of pa-
triotic emancipation and self-determination from under the Kremlin iron heel.
The distortions of such ‘healthy path’ are mostly blamed on Ceaupescu’s person-
ality cult. It is no surprise that in some quarters, his execution was seen as the end
of communism, of its evils and/or legacy. The overall conclusion of such normal-
izing gymnastics was similar to the above-discussed issue: the criminality of the
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regime lay in its anti-national past, while its development of the Nation’s interest
and being can be separated from the degeneration of its leaders.
President Basescu charged the commission with the task of producing a rigor-
ous and coherent document that would examine the main institutions, methods,
and personalities that made possible the crimes and abuses of the communist re-
gime. In addition to its academic tasks, the commission was meant to pass moral
judgment on the defunct dictatorship and invite a reckoning with the past, even
though this would entail a painful, albeit inevitable, acknowledgement of crimes
against humanity and other forms of repression. First of all, this initiative is a fun-
damentally symbolic step toward national reconciliation by means of clarifying
and dealing with the past. Only in this way can Romanian society overcome the
fragmentation typical of the “legacy of Leninism”.2 President Basescu advocated
a reinstitutionalization freed from the burden of the party-state continuities and
the possibility for laying the foundation of a “posttotalitarian legitimacy” (Müller,
2000, 258). It is his belief that only in such fashion can one develop the not-yet-at-
tained national consensus. The process of Vergangenheitsbewältigung that it ini-
tiated imposes criteria of accountability fundamental to the re-enforcement and to
the entrenchment of democratic values in Romanian society. For, as Jan-Werner
Muller argued, “without facing the past, there can be no civic trust, which is the
outcome of a continuous public deliberation about the past” (Müller, 2002, 33–4).
Following upon Ken Jowitt’s footsteps, I consider that the fundamental Lenin-
ist legacy in Eastern Europe was the total fragmentation of society, the break of
the civic bonds and consensus necessary for a healthy, democratic life (Jowitt,
1992; Tismaneanu et al., 2006). The tumultuous post-1989 years in Romania are
the perfect proof for this thesis: sectarian interests, widespread authoritarian ten-
dencies within the public and political spheres, anomie, etc., were all rooted in
forgetfulness. The CPACDR did not find new ‘truth’, but it lifted the veil of denial
over those truths that were widely known but stubbornly unacknowledged.3 In a
country where the legal measures against the abuses perpetrated during the com-
munist years are close to nonexistent and where the judicial system is rather weak
and corrupted, it can be said that the Commission created the future prospects for
justice.
The Final Report, besides its detailed accounts on the functioning of the vari-
ous mechanisms of power and repression, also named names; it listed the most im-
portant people who were guilty for the evils of the regime. It did not stigmatize
any group, its purpose was not inquisitorial; but it engaged in a truth-telling pro-
cess essential for understanding the nature of responsibility for crimes and suffer-
ing under communism. In Priscilla Hayner words: “where justice is unlikely in the
courts, a commission plays an important role in at least publicly shaming those
who orchestrated atrocities”. It revitalized the principle of accountability, funda-
mental for democracy’s survival (Hayner 2002, 82–7).4 Considering the present
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political environment in Romania, I can only reiterate Chilean President Patricio
Aylwin dictum upon the creation of the Retting Commission: justice as far as pos-
sible (justicia en la medida de lo posible). The moral-symbolic action is after all
one of the four types of retributive justice (the others being the criminal, the non-
criminal, and the rectifying aspects) (McAdams, 2001).
The reverberations of the past are part of contemporary polemics and define
competing visions of the future. It is quite often in relation to the past, especially a
traumatic one, that political actors identify themselves and engage in competi-
tions with their opponents. Reviewing Jan T. Gross’s book Fear, David Engel
wrote,
Unless Polishness, whatever its constituent characteristics, is trans-
mitted from generation to generation through mother’s milk, as it
were, nothing that Gross or anyone else might say about any part of
the Polish community in 1946, 1941, or any other year more than six
decades in the past necessarily reflects upon any part of the commu-
nity today. It can do so only to the extent that the present community
continues to affirm the values implicated in past events. Thus Fear or
any other work of history can legitimately be neither offered nor read
as a vehicle for contemporary self-examination except insofar as it
prompts contemporaries to question strongly whether they remain
committed to those values (Engel, 2007, 538–9).5
The postcommunist debates on the past should be seen as indicators of contem-
porary ideological cleavages and tensions, confirming Jürgen Habermas’s analy-
sis of the public use of history as an antidote to oblivion, denial, and partisan dis-
tortions:
It is especially these dead who have a claim to the weak anamnestic
power of a solidarity that later generations can continue to practice
only in the medium of a remembrance that is repeatedly renewed, of-
ten desperate, and continually on one’s mind (Habermas, 1989, 233).
The PCACDR’s Final Report’s approach on the category of perpetrator was
focused on three types that have been consistently ignored by those who blame the
document for a so-called blanket condemnation. According to Cosmina Tanasoiu,
“one can identify those guilty for the thousands of dead and deported” (i.e., top
Party officials, cabinet ministers, police commanders, high-level magistrates),
those “guilty for the annihilation of diaspora dissent” (i.e., the heads of the exter-
nal services of the secret police and counter-intelligence), and those “guilty for the
indoctrination of the population” (the largest category, ranging from Party mem-
bers and cabinet ministers to writers and poets) (Tanasoiu, 2007, 65).
Additionally, the Final Report signaled out those who responsible, after 1989,
for the manipulating and forging the truth in order to preserve their power and
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continue, by means of an “original democracy”, the fateful structures and the in-
terest groups dominant during the last decade of the party-state rule. I think that
this last section of the IIIrd part of the Report, was fully justified by the specific
post-1989 history of Romania, one marred with moments of critical “managed an-
archy” (the miners’ trips to Bucharest and the pyramidal financial schemes), by
the quasi-bankruptcy of the market economy, by infrastructural retardation. Over-
all however, the individual and his inalienable rights were the main reconstitutive
focus of the Final Report. The members of the PCACDR refused the principle of
collective guilt and/or punishment.
The PCACDR was a tool for mediation between the construction of a legiti-
mate post-dictatorial state and the finalisation – or at least the setting under way –
of the judicial act. The present level of transition may be a compromise, but it must
be fundamentally conditioned by knowledge of the criminal past and by the moral
recognition upon which legitimate society is built. I therefore consider Charles
Villa-Vicencio’s conclusion perfectly justified, namely that the truth that a com-
mission makes public and official is not just a working through of the previous re-
gime, but also the criterion for limiting and framing the compromise of the transi-
tional period (Vicencio 2003, 37). The shared historical judgment and memory
such a Commission offers can open the path toward a more profound post-transi-
tional political realignment.
In conclusion, I believe that the condemnation of the communist regime in Ro-
mania was a moment of civic mobilization. Generally speaking, de-communiza-
tion is, in its essence, a moral, political, and intellectual process. These are the di-
mensions that raise challenges in contemporary Romanian society. The
PCACDR’s Final Report answered a fundamental necessity, characteristic of the
post-authoritarian world, that of moral clarity. Without it one would multiply the
cobweb of lies crushing us, the impenetrable mist that seemed to forever last. This
state of moral perplexity inexorably turns into cynicism, anger, resentment and
despair. The shock of past unveiled is inevitable. The Final Report identified
many features of guilt, in relation to the communist experience, that have never
before been under scrutiny. It offers a framework for shedding light upon what
Karl Jaspers called “moral and metaphysical guilt” – the individual’s failure to
live up to his or her moral duties and the destruction of solidarity of social fabric
(Liiceanu, 2007). This, in my opinion, is the angle from which one can see to the
connection between condemnation initiative and politics. In the words of Charles
King,
The commission’s chief tasks had to do with both morality and
power: to push Romanian politicians and Romanian society into
drawing a line between past and present, putting an end to nostalgia
for an alleged period of greatness and independence, and embracing
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the country’s de facto cultural pluralism and European future (King,
2007, 722).
Such matters considered, the PCACDR was indeed a political project through
which both the acknowledgement and conceptualization of the 1945 to 1989 na-
tional traumatic experience were accomplished, whilst those responsible for the
existence of communism as a regime in Romania were identified.
The PCACDR created a document where responsibility for the past was
claimed and individualized. There are hardly other ways of reconstructing
Gemeinsamkeit, that is, the social cohesion and communion destroyed by the at-
omization brought about in the communist regime. As I have already stated, the
Final Report was written with analytical rigor, with compassion for the victims,
and in full awareness of the trauma both incumbent in the past and in the act of re-
membrance itself. PCACDR aimed at a synthesis between understanding the trau-
matic history through an academic praxis that presupposes distance from the sur-
veyed subject, and empathizing with the people who suffered because of the
crimes and abuses of the dictatorship. The commission pursued a reconstruction
of the past along the dichotomy distance–empathy, focusing upon both general
and individual aspects of the past. The Final Report fixed the memory of the totali-
tarian experience in place and in time, it overcame the burden of the denial of
memory, of institutionalized amnesia. It set the ground for the revolutionizing of
the normative foundations of the communal history, imposing the necessary
moral criteria of a democracy that wishes to militantly defend its values.
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Notes
1 An account of this phenomenon is the chapter “Distortion, Negationism, and Minimalization
of the Holocaust in Postwar Romania” of the Final Report of the International Commission on
the Holocaust in Romania. The English version of this document can be found at
http://www.ushmm.org/research/center/presentations/features/details/2005-03-10/.
2 Kenneth Jowitt defined Eastern Europe as a “brittle region” where “suspicion, division, and
fragmentation predominate, not coalition and interrogation” because of lasting emotional, eth-
nic, territorial, demographic, political fragmentation form the (pre-)communist period. See his
chapter “The Legacy of Leninism” in 1992, New World Disorder: the Leninist Extinction
(Berkeley: University of California Press). For a recent discussion of this thesis also see
Tismaneanu, Vladimir, Marc Howard, and Rudra Sil (eds) (2006) World Order After Leninism
(Seattle: University of Washington Press).
3 An excellent example is the reaction of the Romanian Orthodox Church (B.O.R) to the Re-
port’s chapter about the relationship between the regime and the confessional communities.
The irrefutable evidence of widespred cooperation with the R.C.P. and the B.O.R’s infiltration
by the Securitate generated vehement reactions from the institution’s representatives and from
the journalists and scholars with orthodoxist inclinations. The uproar went as far as the official
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declaration by the B.O.R about the creation of a special Commission under its umbrella for the
creation of a counter-report. After the death of Teoctist in 2007, the Patriarch of B.O.R., his
successor, Daniel, gave up on this initiative.
4 Priscilla Hayner makes a very convincing argument about the ways in which the activity of
truth commissions can supplant for the fallacies and impotence of the judicial process, about
the means by which a commission’s activity and results can become the foundation for future
legal action against abuses of the past.
5 See also Gross, Jan T. (2006) Fear: Anti-Semitism in Poland after Auschwitz – An Essay in
Historical Interpretation (New York: Random House).
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